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Abstract 
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1 Introduction
Rawls (1971) introduces the notion of primary goods as a reference for his
theory of justice. These goods are deemed essential for the survival and self-
respect of agents, so that no trade-o¤ between these and other goods can be
admitted. Rights, liberties, income and opportunities are the main categories
of this type of goods. The chief idea in Rawls formulation is that all agents
have the right to enjoy these goods equally, so that the key principle for
social evaluation is the maximin criterion. Similar ideas have been pursued
by some economists, trying to disentangle variables such as opportunities,
rights or needs from utilities. Among them let us mention the works of Kolm
(1972) and Sen (1985) [the reader is referred to the discussion in Fleurbeay
(1996) and Roemer (1996, ch. 5); see also the approach in Herrero (1996)].
Let us narrow the scope of the analysis and concentrate on distribution
problems. Following the idea behind Rawls’ di¤erence principle, let us apply
the term “primary goods” to those commodities that should be distributed
equally among the agents. We can think of goods such as basic schooling,
primary health services, social security bene…ts, etc. That is, goods which
have to do with the equality of opportunity of economic agents. These goods
typically represent the material counterpart of some basic rights that de…ne
the entitlements of the citizens in a given society. Note that in some cases the
consumption of primary goods is to be interpreted as potential consumption
rather than real consumption (meaning that, as in the case of public goods,
what is important is the availability of these goods).
The purpose of this paper is to provide an index that can be considered
as a cardinal welfare measure of the allocation of these primary goods. For
that we start by restricting the choice of welfare indices to the family of ho-
mogeneous functions. This allows to evaluate allocations as a weighted sum
of individual consumption vectors. These weights describe the individuals’
social marginal worth in the evaluation function. Therefore, our value judge-
ments on social welfare can be naturally expressed in terms of the weighting
system.
The key equity principle in this analysis will be that of progressivity. By
this we mean that the ith agent’s social marginal worth, with respect to
a given commodity, is negatively correlated and inversely proportional to
her share in total consumption. That is, we are going to give progressively
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more weight in social welfare to those agents with smaller shares in total
consumption, and viceversa. Combining the progressivity principle with a
suitable scaling system permits one to measure social welfare as the sum of
n partial indices (one for each primary good). Each of these partial indices
is a function increasing in the amount of the good consumed and decreasing
in its dispersion, measured by Theil’s …rst inequality index.
The analysis is carried out according to two methodological principles:
(i) Social welfare is de…ned directly in terms of the availability of primary
goods and not as a function of agents’ utilities. This is an explicit departure
from welfarism because agents’ utilities are not the leading variables in the
welfare evaluation of primary goods.
(ii) The social marginal worth attached to the consumption of a given
primary good depends on the good considered and the agent who consumes
it. This principle is related to Sen’s (1976) “personalized goods approach”
and allows us to evaluate allocations by means of a system of shadow prices
which weight commodities di¤erently, depending on the agent who consumes
them.
This methodological approach has been successfully applied to the wel-
fare analysis of one-dimensional distribution problems, following the ideas of
Sen (1976), (1979) [see for instance Osmani (1982), Chakravarty & Dutta
(1990), Herrero &Villar (1992)]. Our contribution here extends the works
in Herrero & Villar (1989) and Tomás & Villar (1993) on the evaluation of
income distributions, allowing for a multidimensional variable and re…ning
the axiomatization of the welfare measure.
It will be implicitly assumed through the paper that: (a) The class of
primary goods is already given —that is, we shall not discuss here which
commodities ought to be considered as primary goods; (b) Primary goods
are measurable by some real numbers that describe their availability (physical
units); (c) Each primary good has associated with it a market price (or a well
de…ned unitary cost); and (d) Agents are taken to be homogeneous; namely,
we shall ignore the scaling problem that arises when agents are di¤erent
in size and characteristics [there are standard procedures to deal with this
problem by means of equivalence scales; see for instance Deaton & Muellbauer
(1980), Ruiz-Castillo (1995)].
Let us point out that these results are applicable to a number of practical
problems. One of particular interest refers to the social evaluation of local
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public goods. This is an important problem when we consider an economy
consisting of m di¤erent regions which are responsible for the provision of a
number of public services (health, education, unemployment bene…ts, etc.).
One can think of the European Union or of a Federal State that gives their
citizens the right to enjoy these basic services, no matter where they choose
to live.1 The welfare index proposed here provides a social evaluation of the
overall allocation of public services, depending upon the quantities provided
by each State and its dispersion.
The work is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the model and the
characterization result. Section 3 elaborates on the application of this for-
mula to the analysis of the many-groups many-goods case.
2 The model and the results
Consider an economy consisting of m homogeneous agents and n primary
goods, measured in some given units. A point xi 2 Rn++ denotes a con-
sumption vector for the ith agent, i = 1; 2; :::;m (that is, xij describes the
amount of the jth primary good available for this agent, that we take to be
strictly positive). A point x 2Rmn++ describes an allocation for the economy.
For every j = 1; 2; :::; n, call Xj =
Pm
i=1 xij —that is, Xj is the aggregate
amount of commodity j in the distribution x:
The key point of our analysis is the identi…cation of a welfare criterion
that enables the evaluation of allocations x 2Rmn++: That is, we look for a
social evaluation function V : Rmn++ ! R which permits one to perform
welfare assessments of the overall allocation of primary goods. The proper-
ties of this evaluation function will re‡ect the value judgments involved. We
shall restrict the search of this evaluation function to the family of cardinal
(and smooth) measures. To be precise, we denote by V the family of evalu-
ation functions V : Rmn++ ! R that are homogeneous of degree one and twice
di¤erentiable.
The homogeneity property is equivalent to the existence of a complete,
continuous and homothetic social preference preordering on the set of allo-
cations Rmn++. It introduces a cardinal element in the evaluation, as V (¸x) =
1Needless to say that in this case agents may be widely di¤erent witht respect to their
size and characteristics, and that the scaling problem comes to the forefront.
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¸V (x) for every ¸ > 0: The di¤erentiability property is an operational re-
quirement that will facilitate our reasoning.
For any given V 2 V Euler’s theorem implies that the evaluation of a given
allocation x 2Rmn++ can be expressed as V (x) = rV (x)x; where rV (x) stands
for the vector of partial derivatives of V . Hence, calling fij(x) = @V (x)=@xij
for each x in Rmn++ we have:
V (x) =
mX
i=1
nX
j=1
fij(x)xij [1]
This expression says that the social welfare of allocation x can be mea-
sured as a weighted sum of individual consumption levels, where the co-
e¢cient fij(x) describes the social marginal worth of individual i as a
consumer of the jth primary good. Note that taking V in V implies that
these weights are homogeneous of degree zero. That is, each agent’s social
marginal worth depends on the distribution of primary goods but not their
levels.
Now we shall establish some assumptions on this evaluation function V 2
V: These axioms express our value judgments, in terms of properties of the
weighting system fij(x).
Axiom 1 (Independence) For every i = 1; 2; :::;m and every j = 1; 2; :::; n;
fij(x) = fj(xij;Xj):
Axiom 2 (Minimal Equity) Let x; x0 be such that
Pm
i=1 xik =
Pm
i=1 x
0
ik
for all k; and let xij > x0ij: Then, fij(x) < fij(x
0):
Axiom 3 (All for Nothing) limxij!Xj fij(x) = 0:
Axiom 4 (Progressivity) Let "ij(x) denote the elasticity of the weighting
function with respect to xij: For all i = 1; 2; :::;m; all j = 1; 2; :::; n;
"ij(x) =
®j
fij(x)
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Axiom 1 translates into this context the notion of decentralizability com-
monly used in the literature on cost/surplus sharing problems [e.g. Moulin
(1988, ch. 6)]. It may be seen as combining informational e¢ciency (as this
is the only relevant information) and anonymity (the social marginal worth
does not depend on the names of the agents). When n = 1 it simply says
that the social marginal worth of each agent depends only on its own con-
sumption and on the aggregate (actually on her share). When n > 1 this
also expresses the idea that the marginal worth of an agent, as a consumer of
a given good, is evaluated independently of her consumption of other goods.
Namely, there is no substitutability in agents’ marginal worth, as the very
notion of primary goods suggests.
Axiom 2 says that the change in the social marginal worth of the ith
agent due to a change in her own consumption, while keeping constant the
total amount available, is negatively correlated to her consumption level.
The axiom of Minimal Equity, introduced by Sen (1973, p. 18), constitutes
a basic value judgment: we are going to give more weight in social welfare
to those agents with smaller relative consumption of primary goods.
Axiom 3 says, roughly speaking, that when a single agent is the only
consumer of a given primary good her social marginal worth is taken to be
zero. So getting all means contributing nothing to social welfare. Note that
axioms 2 and 3 together imply that fij(x) ¸ 0, that is, social welfare grows
with the amounts of goods available.
Finally, axiom 4 postulates that the elasticity of fij with respect to xij is
inversely proportional to fij: That is, the ith agent’s social marginal worth
as a consumer of the jth primary good changes more the smaller her weight.
It follows from axioms 2 and 3 that ®j < 0: Therefore, axioms 2, 3 and 4
together establish that the poorer an agent is, the smaller the reduction of
her weight in social welfare associated with a given increase in her share.
Remark 1 Progressivity makes this welfare index compatible with the “prin-
ciple of Dalton”, which postulates that a transfer from rich to poor that does
not change their ranking increases social welfare. It can also be regarded as
an instance of “second order Minimal Equity” (as it applies this principle to
the change in the social marginal worth).
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Let us recall here the de…nition of Theil’s …rst inequality index.2 Let
y 2Rm++ stand for a distribution of a given one-dimensional variable, and call
zi = yi=¹ (where ¹ stands for the average). Theil’s …rst inequality index is
given by:
T (y) =
1
m
mX
i=1
zi ln zi
When y is a vector of personal incomes T (y) can be interpreted as a mea-
sure of the distance between population shares and income shares [see Theil
(1967)]. It is easy to see that 0 · T (y) · lnm: This suggests that we can
de…ne the normalized Theil’s inequality index as eT (y) = 1
lnm
T (y); so
that 0 · eT (y) · 1:
For x 2 Rmn++; let Tj(x) denote the value of Theil’s inequality index relative
to the distribution of the jth variable, and eTj(x) the associated normalized
index. The following result is obtained:
Theorem 1 A social evaluation function V 2 V satis…es axioms 1 to 4 if
and only if, for every x 2 Rmn++ we have
V (x) =
nX
j=1
¯jXj
h
1¡ eTj(x)i
where ¯j > 0 for all j:
Proof.
We know that the evaluation function V 2 V can be written as V (x) =Pm
i=1
Pn
j=1 fij(x)xij: It follows from axioms 1 to 4 that:
@fij(x)
@xij
=
@fj(xij; Xj)
@xij
=
®j
xij
[2]
with ®j < 0: Moreover, as fij is homogeneous of degree zero in x; it follows
that fj(¸xij; ¸Xj) = fj(xij; Xj): Therefore, letting ¸j = m=Xj we can de…ne
an auxiliary function °j : R++ ! R as follows:
2For a discussion of this inequality index the reader is referred to Blackorby & Donald-
son (1978), Bourguignon (1979), Cowell & Kuga (1981) and Foster (1983).
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fij(
1
¹j
x) = fj(
xij
¹j
;m) = °j(sij)
where ¹j = Xj=m is the average consumption of the jth primary good and
sij = xij=¹j represents the ith agent’s share in this average. By construction,
and in view of [2] above, we can write:
@fj
@xij
=
d°j
dsij
1
¹j
=
®j
xij
which gives us:
d°j(sij)
dsij
=
®j
sij
Solving this di¤erential equation we obtain:
°j(sij) = Cj + ®j ln sij [3]
Axiom 4 establishes that fij(x) ! 0 when xij ! Xj : Hence, taking
the limit case we …nd that °j(m) = 0; which in view of [3] implies that
Cj = ¡ lnm®j: Therefore,
V (x) =
nX
j=1
"
mX
i=1
(¡ lnm®j + ®j ln sij)xij
#
=
nX
j=1
"
¡ lnm®jXj + ®j
mX
i=1
xij ln sij
#
=
nX
j=1
"
¡ lnm®jXj + ®j¹j
mX
i=1
sij ln sij
#
=
nX
j=1
Xj
"
¡ lnm®j + ®j 1
m
mX
i=1
sij ln sij
#
=
nX
j=1
Xj [¡ lnm®j + ®jTj(x)] =
nX
j=1
(¡ lnm®j)Xj
h
1¡ eTj(x)i
Finally, letting ¯j = ¡ lnm®j > 0; we get:
nX
j=1
¯jXj
h
1¡ eTj(x)i
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Theorem 1 says that choosing an evaluation function in the set V that
satis…es axioms 1 to 4 is equivalent to measuring social welfare as a weighted
sum of the amounts of primary goods available, each de‡ated by a term that
expresses the distance with respect to the egalitarian distribution, measured
by Theil’s normalized inequality index.
Note that each termXj
h
1¡ eTj(x)i corresponds to the egalitarian equiv-
alent amount of commodity j; in the sense of Atkinson-Kolm-Sen. That is,
the amount of commodity j that equally distributed would make the society
as well-o¤ as with the real amount available, when inequality is measured by
Theil’s normalized inequality index. To see this notice that the egalitarian
equivalent amount of the jth commodity, whose distribution is described by
a vector xj = (x1j ; x2j ; :::; xmj)2Rm++; with Xj =
Pm
i=1 xij is given by mx
¤
j ;
where x¤j is the quantity that satis…es:
eTj(x) = 1¡ x¤j
¹j
Therefore, mx¤j = Xj[1 ¡ eTj(x)]: Consequently, by letting X¤j to denote the
egalitarian equivalent amount of j; the Theorem boils down to:
V (x) =
nX
j=1
¯jX
¤
j
Remark 2 Observe that the homogeneity of V ensures a one to one corre-
spondence between welfare measures and inequality measures [see Blackorby
& Donaldson (1978)].
The coe¢cients ¯1; :::; ¯n scale the contribution of the egalitarian equiva-
lent amounts of primary goods to social welfare. The determination of these
parameters requires imposing further restrictions on the evaluation function.
In so doing one has to take into account that our evaluation function V might
be sensitive to the units in which di¤erent commodities are measured. That
is, it might be that V (x) > V (y) for some x;y 2Rmn++, whereas V (x0) < V (y0);
when x0;y0 are the same commodity vectors measured in di¤erent units.3
3Needless to say that this problem does not appear when n = 1; or when commodities
are expressed in value terms (i.e. xij = pjyij ; where yij denotes a given amount of good
j in physical units and pj its corresponding price).
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There is a number of alternative scales that permits one to close the
evaluation formula. Each one amounts to assign relative weights to primary
goods as components of social welfare. The procedure we adopt here is to
…nd these parameters by …xing the values that individual weights fij take
on at the egalitarian distribution, xij = ¹j for all i; j: This is the polar case
considered in the “All for nothing” axiom, and provides a natural way to
de…ne an additional reference point.
Let p 2 Rn++ stand for the vector of market prices (or unit costs) of
primary goods. By taking this vector as given, we postulate:
Axiom 5 (Price scale) xij = Xj=m for all i = 1; 2; :::;m; all j = 1; 2; :::; n;
implies fij(x) = pj:
This axiom establishes that when all agents consume identical amounts
of a given commodity, a perfectly egalitarian allocation, we take commodity
prices as a measure of social welfare. One may interpret this as a way of mea-
suring social welfare which is respectful with agents’ unanimous judgments.
Namely, all agents agree on the marginal worth of that commodity (as mar-
ket prices correspond precisely to the ratio of agents’ marginal utilities), and
all agents enjoy the same consumption.
Scaling the weighting system by means of a reference price vector has
three major advantages: (1) It makes V independent of changes in the units
of measurement (because changing the unit of commodity j by a factor ¸j
implies dividing its price by ¸j); (2) It has a well de…ned economic meaning:
it …xes a scale that re‡ects the relative weight that markets give to these
goods (and that we would admit as welfare weights only in the hypothetical
situation in which all agents consume identical amounts); and (3) It permits
one to choose units so that pj = 1 for all j: In this case xij represents both
the physical amount of the j commodity available for the ith agent, and the
ith agent’s expenditure in the jth good.
The following result is obtained:
Corollary 2 A social evaluation function V 2 V satis…es axioms 1 to 5 if
and only if, for every x 2 Rmn++ we have
V (x) =
nX
j=1
pjXj
h
1¡ eTj(x)i
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Proof.
Axiom 5 says that fij(x) = pj when xij = ¹j ; that is, °j(1) = pj : Sub-
stituting this value in equation [3] and bearing in mind that axiom 4 implies
that Cj = ¯j, it follows that ¯j = pj. Substituting in the last equation we
obtain the desired result.
This result says that the welfare evaluation associated to axioms 1 to 5 is
given by the sum of n terms, one for each primary good. Each term measures
the contribution of a particular good to the social welfare as its market worth
de‡ated by the normalized Theil’s inequality index. Therefore, one can take
the aggregate worth of primary goods as a suitable measure of social welfare
if and only if all goods are equally distributed (that is, when Tj(x) = 0 for
all j so that V (x) =
Pn
j=1 pjXj):
Remark 3 Observe that when our variables are expressed in value terms (as
it will typically be the case in many empirical applications) this price scale is
automatically incorporated by letting ¯j = 1 for all j:
Remark 4 The price scale can be criticized because market prices partly
re‡ect the initial distribution of endowments (via the income and substitution
e¤ects between primary goods and other commodities). To avoid this problem
one might take a di¤erent reference price vector, such as the equilibrium price
vector associated to the egalitarian distribution of all resources.
3 A …nal comment: The many-goods many-
groups case
Let us conclude by brie‡y commenting on the application of this welfare
measure to the analysis of a society made of di¤erent sub-societies (think
of the regions in a country, the states in the U.S.A., or the countries of
the European Union). This is a classical topic in the study of inequality
measurement, that is usually addressed under the heading of “decomposabil-
ity”. Note however that here we cannot apply the standard decomposability
procedure to our welfare index, because the normalized Theil index is not
decomposable. Moreover, normalizing the index is necessary to ensure that
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our welfare measure is well de…ned (more precisely, that V is increasing in the
amounts of goods and decreasing in their dispersion). There is nevertheless a
simple way of assessing the overall welfare loss that is due to the distribution
of the primary goods between and within the groups of the society under
consideration.
Consider a society made of k sub-societies. To …x ideas let us consider the
case of a state consisting of k regions. Letms denote the population of region
s (s = 1; 2; :::; k). The distribution of the jth primary good within region s
is described by a vector y(j; s) 2 Rms++; whereas ey(s) = [y(1; s); :::;y(n; s)] 2
Rnms++ stands for the vector that describes the distribution of the n primary
goods within region s:
Under axioms 1 to 5 we can measure the welfare of region s associated
with a distribution ey(s) as follows:
V [ey(s)] = nX
j=1
Y sj
h
1¡ eT [y(j; s)]i s = 1; 2; :::; k
where Y sj is the total worth of good j that is available in region s (evaluated
at the appropriate market prices) and eT [y(j; s)] is the normalized Theil’s
measure of the inequality in region s with respect to the jth good.
Similarly, let ey = [ey(1); ey(2); :::; ey(k)] 2 Rnm++; with m =Pks=1ms; denote
the whole country’s distribution of the n goods. Now for each j = 1; 2; :::; n;
let Yj =
Pk
s=1 Y
s
j and let eTj(ey) denote the normalized inequality index in the
whole population, relative to the jth primary good. Applying our welfare
measure country-wise, we obtain:
V (ey) = nX
j=1
Yj
h
1¡ eTj(ey)i
Now observe that, for all s = 1; 2; :::; k; all j = 1; 2; :::; n; the number
Y sj eT [y(j; s)] measures the welfare loss that occurs within region s due to the
unequal distribution of the jth primary good. Therefore,
kX
s=1
Y sj eT [y(j; s)]
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is the aggregate welfare loss within the k regions that derives from the allo-
cation of the jth primary good. Therefore,
W =
nX
j=1
kX
s=1
Y sj eT [y(j; s)]
is the aggregate welfare loss within the k regions derived from the unequal
distribution of the whole bundle of primary goods.
Similarly, Yj eTj(ey) measures the welfare loss of the country due to the
overall inequality between individuals associated with the jth primary good,
whereas
Pn
j=1 Yj
eTj(ey) measures the country’s total welfare loss due to the
overall inequality. Therefore, for all j = 1; 2; :::; n; the di¤erence between
these two numbers,
Yj eTj(ey)¡ kX
s=1
Y sj eT [y(j; s)] = Bj
gives us the welfare loss that can be attributed to the di¤erences between the
regions in the allocation of good j; whereas:
B =
nX
j=1
Bj =
nX
j=1
Ã
Yj eTj(ey)¡ kX
s=1
Y sj eT [y(j; s)]
!
= V (ey)¡ kX
s=1
V [ey(s)]
gives us the total welfare loss that can be attributed to the overall inequality
between the k regions.
Since B is precisely the di¤erence between the welfare measure de…ned
on the distribution of the primary goods among whole population and the
sum of all regions’ welfare measures, we can write:
V (ey) = Y ¡W ¡B
This expression says that the aggregate welfare of a country, associated
with a given distribution of n primary goods, can expressed as the aggregate
worth of these goods Y =
Pn
j=1 Yj; de‡ated by two components, W and B;
that describe the welfare loss due to the inequality within and between the
regions, respectively.
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